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THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN BENEFIT
RECOVERY ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER ERISA
SECTION 502(a)(l)(B)

I. - INTRODUCTION

Much litigation has ensued over whether a party is entitled to a
jury trial in a civil suit brought in federal court pursuant to § 502
(a)(1)(B) ("§ 502") of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA").I ERISA establishes a comprehensive scheme of
federal laws governing pension plans, private welfare plans, benefit
claims, and fiduciary responsibility. Enforcement under ERISA may
arise when employees seek to recover earned pension benefits.
Various federal courts, including some district courts within the
same circuit, have considered the right to a jury trial in actions
brought under ERISA and have reached conflicting decisions. 2 The
importance of a jury trial to the plaintiff becomes obvious if one
believes that the jury may be swayed by the relative financial resources
of the opposing parties. 3
This Comment begins with an overview of standards employed
by federal courts4 in determining whether a party is entitled to a jury
trial generally. Next, the comment discusses how courts have applied
these standards to jury trial requests in claims brought pursuant to
§ 502. This second tier of analysis specifically focuses on: 1) cases
decided prior to 1989; 2) Supreme Court decisions in Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co. v Bruch,s Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,6 and
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988 & Supp. I 1989) [hereinafter § 502].
2. The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue.
3. Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(0)(1)(8)
of ERISA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 737 n.7 (1983).
4. Although state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear claims brought under
ERISA, the scope of this comment is limited to the federal law. Federal courts
continue to interpret ERISA as broadly preemptive of state law claims relating
to employee benefit plans in. the area of employee benefits, which narrows the
extent to which these courts will hear pendent claims grounded in state law.
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988 & Supp. I 1989) (stating that the provisions of ERISA
supersede "any and all State laws" insofar as they relate to any employee
benefit plan as described in the coverage of ERISA). See generally Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1989) (ERISA preempts state common law
tort and contract claims alleging improper processing of an insured's claim for
health benefits).
5. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
6. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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the 1990 decision of Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391
v. Terry;7 and 3) the impact of the Firestone, Granfinanciera and
Terry decisions on federal courts deciding the § 502 litigant's right
to a jury trial. The, Comment concludes that if the present Supreme
Court were to decide the § 502 jury trial issue, it would most likely
decide that a constitutional right to a jury trial does exist in certain
circumstances.
II.

SECTION 502 AND THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

ERISA provides a "panoply of remedial devices" for both
participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans. s These remedies are specifically provided in § 502. Although this section defines
six separate civil enforcement provisions granting participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and/or benefit plan administrators the right to
bring suit if specified rights have been violated,9 the most frequently
litigated provision - § 502 (a)(1)(B) - provides:
[a] civil action may be brought by a partiCipant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan .... 10
An issue frequently raised in the context of § 502 litigation is
whether the participant or beneficiary is entitled to demand a jury
trial. While the standards are well settled for determining whether a
litigant in a federal civil action is entitled to a jury trial, II application
of these principles to a § 502 action has proved troublesome.
The analysis of a federal civil litigant's right to a jury trial has
two steps. First, the court will attempt to ascertain from the statute
at issue whether Congress, either expresslyl2 or implicitly, 13 intended
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

494 U.S. 558 (1990).
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985).
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
[d. at § 1132(a)(1)(B).
See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974) (seventh amendment
preserves the right to a jury in suit for damages brought pursuant to Title
VIII); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1970) ("corporation's suit to
enforce a legal right was an action at common law carrying the right to a jury
trial at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted"); Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476 (1962) (claim for breach of a licensing agreement
seeking monetary damages is "unquestionably legal"; hence, seventh amendment preserved the right to a jury).
12. See, e.g., Allen v. United Mine Workers, 319 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1963) (An
employee who sues pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
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to grant the right to a jury trial. If the court finds that Congress
neither provided for nor intended to grant the right to a jury trial,
then the court must determine if a litigant has a jury trial right
pursuant to the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution,14 The seventh amendment provides that, "[i]n suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... " IS
III.

A.

THE LAW PRIOR TO 1989

Jury Trials Under ERISA

ERISA does not expressly grant a litigant the right to a jury
trial. 16 Thus, a party seeking a jury trial in an ERISA action must
attempt to establish that ERISA implies such a right, by proving
that the statutory scheme and legislative history support such congressional intent. As the case law demonstrates, the jury trial determination has proved to be a strained exercise in legislative intent
analysis that has divided the federal courtS. 17 Moreover, the differences in the rationales argued by each side on the issue are not easily
reconciled.
1.

Section 502 Claims - An Action at Law or Equity?

In determining whether Congress intended to provide a jury trial
right in ERISA, it is important to recognize i~itially that laws enacted
by Congress are presumed to be constitutional. IS Furthermore, when
Congress enacts a law or permits a remedy, it is presumed to know

13.

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

for monetary damages caused by the breach of a collective bargaining agreement
is expressly entitled to a jury trial on request.).
See, e.g .• Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (Congress
intended to provide a litigant with a jury trial in cases brought under federal
antitrust laws); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359
(1952) (implied right to a jury trial in cases brought under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act).
A cardinal rule which is followed by federal courts addressing the issue of
whether a litigant has a right to a jury trial in an action brought under a
federal statute is to "first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided." Curtis
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (quoting United States v. ThirtySeven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971».
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). See Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp.,
770 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986).
United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also infra
notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
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the judicial gloss previously given to the statutory language of that
law or remedy, 19 and it adopts the existing interpretation of the
language unless it expressly acts to change the meaning. 20
The Supreme Court has previously held that the right to a jury
trial depends on whether the action is analogous to a "suit at common
law;" that is, a suit appropriately brought in the English law courts
prior to the adoption of the seventh amendment in 1791. 21 If an
action is analogous to a suit at common law, the plaintiff may
demand that it be tried before a jury.22 Conversely, if an action is
analogous to those historically tried in the courts of equity or
admiralty in 18th century England, no jury trial is permitted. 23 The
modern Supreme Court approach in determining whether an action
should be tried as one "at law" or "in equity" is to examine both
the nature of the action and the remedy sought. 24
To determine whether Congress intended to convey a right to a
jury trial under a federal statute, courts examine Congressional
language to see if the conferred remedies are "legal" in nature. If
the language or remedies Congress has provided are "legal" in nature,
courts are apt to find an implied right to a jury trial. 2S On the other
hand, if courts find that Congress has used language or conferred
remedies that are "equitable" in nature, courts are apt to find no
such intent, and no right to a trial by jury. 26
The courts, however, are divided over whether § 502 grants legal
or equitable rights. A minority have read § 502 to confer a right "at
law." The minority adopts the reasoning first set forth in Stamps v.
Michigan Teamsters Joint Council 43. 27
In Stamps, plaintiff brought suit to recover employee and union
retirement benefits.28 The district court, noting jurisdiction under
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.

Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d 1241, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
[d.
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
[d.
[d.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
538 n.1O (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962).
Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18.
[d. The Supreme Court also noted that it "considered the practical limitations
of a jury trial and its functional compatibility with proceedings outside of
traditional courts of law in holding that the seventh amendment is not applicable
to administrative proceedings." [d. at 418 n.4. However, in light of Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), discussed infra at notes 10924 and accompanying text, consideration of the jury's "functional compatibility" with non-Article III forums no longer appears to be relevant for purposes
of the seventh amendment analysis.
431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
[d. at 746. Initially an action for breach contract in state court, defendants
removed the case to federal court.

1991)

ERISA Benefit Recovery Actions

483

both § 502 as well as the Labor-Management Relations Act (the
"LMRA"), found that § 502 was silent as to whether Congress had
created a legal or equitable claim. 29 The federal court, however,
denied the defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's request for a jury
trial, reasoning that, because a companion provision - § 502(a)(3)
- expressly provided for equitable relief,30 the absence of such a
provision in § 502(a)(1)(B) should be construed as creating a legal
claim entitling the plaintiff to a jury trial. 31
The Stamps court found support for its interpretation of ERISA
in the legislative history. The court alluded to the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference, which provides:
All such [§ 502] actions in Federal or State courts are to be
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in
similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.32
Relying upon this statement in the legislative history, the Stamps
court reasoned that, because a plaintiff would have been entitled to
a jury trial under the LMRA for benefits which arose before ERISA
was enacted, Congress must also have intended a jury should "in
similar fashion" be available for claims under § 502.33 In analogizing
the plaintiff's claim to one brought under the LMRA, the court
characterized the recovery action under § 502 as one at law "for
damages flowing from an alleged breach of contract."34
Several district courts and, arguably, one circuit have agreed
with some of the reasoning adopted by the Stamps court and its
construction of § 502. 3S Beginning with the Seventh Circuit's decision
29. Id. at 746-47.
30. § 502(a)(3) provides that "[a] civil action may be brought ... by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations, or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan .... " 29 U.S.C. §
1I32(a)(3) (1988).
31. Stamps, 431 F. Supp. at 747.
32. Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5107).
33. Stamps, 431 F. Supp. at 747.
34.Id.
35. See, e.g., Pollock v." Castrovincini, 476 F. Supp. 606, aff'd without opinion,
622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1979) (following statutory construction propounded in
Stamps in granting right to jury); Puz V. Bessemer Cement Co., 700 F. Supp .
• 267 (W.O. Pa. 1988) (ERISA dispute that is contractual in nature and does
not relate to trustee's use of discretion may be heard by a jury); Bower V.
Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (ERISA suit is contractual
in nature and could be tried before a jury); Paladino V. Taxicab Indus. Pension
Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (expressly following the Stamps
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in Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund,36 however, the overwhelming majority of circuits addressing
the issue have either expressly refused to follow the reasoning in
Stamps or have followed WardleY
The Stamps court argued that § 502(a)(1)(B) would be superfluous in light of the language in § 502(a)(3). The majority of courts
addressing the issue, however, have decided that treating claims
brought under § 502(a)(1)(B) as equitable would not make § 502(a)(3)
superfluous. For example, in Wardle, the Seventh Circuit stated:
We must respectfully disagree with the reasoning of the
Stamps court. . .. The specific types of claims enumerated
in § 502(a)(1)(B) would still have to be separated in some
manner from general equitable actions under § 502(a)(3)
because Congress granted state courts concurrent jurisdiction
. only over § 502(a)(1)(B) claims. Thus, the statutory scheme
does not imply that § 502(a)(1)(B) claims are legal. 38

Wardle and its progeny have also refused to follow the Stamps
court's construction of the legislative history of ERISA as providing
an action at law. These courts have determined that the legislative
rationale); Bouton v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, B.N.A. Pens. Rep. No. 226, D-l (E.D. Tenn. 1978). But see Katsaros
v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984)
(explicitly refusing to follow Pollock).
36. 627 F.2d 820, 828-30 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). The
Seventh Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to decide the § 502 jury
trial issue.
37. See, e.g., In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 321-22 (8th Cir. 1982) (expressly
rejecting Stamps in favor of Wardle in holding that plaintiffs were not entitled
to a jury trial for claims that retirement plan violated § 502 by denying
employees present and future benefits); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235,
1236-37 (5th Cir. 1980) (expressly agreeing with Wardle's criticism of Stamps
in holding that plaintiff was not entitled to have a jury hear § 502 claims for
compensatory damages); see also Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636-37
(3d Cir. 1989) (citing with approval the decisions in Wardle, Calamia and
Vorpahl in holding that no jury trial exists for employee suing his employer
under § 502); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir.
1985) (citing Wardle and Vorpahl with approval in holding that Congress did
not intend for a jury trial right in a § 502 action); Blau v. Del Monte Corp.,
748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (no statutory or constitutional right to
jury exists in ERISA actions), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). See generally
Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(aj(I)(B)
of ERISA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1983); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in
ERISA Section 502(a)(l)(B) Actions: Wardle v. Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1208 (1981).
38. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829 (citations omitted); see also Vorpahl, 695 F.2d at
321; Calamia, 632 F.2d at 1237; Pane v. RCA Corp., 667 F. Supp. 168, 17475 (D.N.J. 1987).
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history cited by Stamps merely indicates that Congress' intent was
for federal courts to create a federal common law under § 502, much
the same way that courts could establish a federal common law for
claims arising under LMRA. The courts that follow Wardle distinguish claims under LMRA from claims under ERISA and argue that
federal common law rights do not necessarily apply to ERISA claims. 39

2. Is a § 502 Claim More Like a Trust Action or an Action for
Breach of Contract?
Prior to 1989, another prevalent § 502 jury trial issue concerned
whether a claim fell under the law of trusts, which historically has
been treated as equitable, or whether the claim was more like a
breach of contract with disputed questions of material fact that were
more appropriate for a jury to resolve. The courts have shown far
more division on this issue than on the issue of legislative intent
addressed in Stamps.

a.

Breach of Trust Theory

Federal courts have analogized the rights and remedies created
by ERISA with those created under the law of trustS.40 In fact, the
Supreme Court recently characterized ERISA as "abound[ing] with
the language and terminology of trust law. "41 As the Third Circuit
remarked in Turner v. CF&I Steel Corp. :42
The remedies of trust beneficiaries against trustees or third
parties are equitable rather than legal ... [w]e are persuaded
that the [§ 502] remedy plaintiffs sought in the case at hand
is equitable. The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Central
States, Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc. - that the
duties of plan trustees are to be examined under the common
law of trusts - supports our conclusion that only equitable
relief is available under § 502(a)(I)(B) of ERISA.43

39. See, e.g., Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829; Vorpahl, 695 F.2d at 321; Calamia, 632
F.2d at 1237.
40. Under the common law of trusts, courts have almost uniformly held that
proceedings to determine rights under employee benefit plans are equitable,
and thus should be tried to a judge and not a jury. Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985); Wardle v. Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d at 829 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1112 (1981); Strout V. GTE Products Corp., 618 F. Supp. 444,44546 (D. Me. 1985).
41. Firestone Tire and Rubber CO. V. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).
42. 770 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1985).
43. [d. at 47 (citations omitted).
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The Turner court concluded that ERISA actions are similar to
trust actions but held that litigants are entitled to a jury trial when
money must be paid by the trustee "unconditionally and immediately."44 Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that "ERISA's legis. lative history confirms that the fiduciary responsibility provisions
'codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trustS."'4S Consequently, some courts have concluded that, because the law of trusts
has historically been considered equitable in character, Congress'
silence on the jury trial right reflects an intention that ERISA suits
must likewise be treated as arising in equity.46
In support of the conclusion that a § 502 action is akin to an
equitable action and should not be tried before a jury, courts have
pointed to the standard of review utilized in trust actions; prior to
1989, federal courts uniformly accepted the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review found in LMRAY Under this reasoning,
courts will not set aside the decision of an ERISA fiduciary or
administrator unless they find that such a decision was "arbitrary
and capricious," not supported by substantial evidence, or erroneous
on a question of law. 48 Some of the federal courts that adopted the
view that ERISA actions should be tried without a jury reasoned
that the standard of review used in ERISA claims shows an intent
that such cases are equitable. 49 These courts have held that such a
deferential standard of review "bespeaks a legislative scheme granting
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-98 (1959).
45. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, p.ll (1973». See
generally ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
46. Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Vorpahl,
695 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1982) (concluding that § 502 lawsuits should be
considered as equitable in character based on the law of trusts); Wardle v.
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
47. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 823-24; Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir.
1976); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1975); see Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1988).
48. Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton, 797 F.2d 521, 525 (7th Cir.
1986).
49. See, e.g., Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Ind., Inc., 814 F.2d 620,623-24 (11th
Cir. 1987) (standard of review for both federal district courts and courts of
appeal is limited in ERISA cases to the arbitrary and capricious standard);
Turner v. CF&I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1985) (limited scope
of review over a trustees decision not compatible with the right to a jury trial);
Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1985) (suits to
determine rights under employee benefit plans are equitable in character);
Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980) (determination of whether
pension fund acted arbitrarily and capriciously was traditionally performed by
judges, not juries); Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829-30 (pension benefit suits are
equitable in nature).
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initial discretionary decision making to bodies other than the federal
courts, with which federal jury trials have proved incompatible."50
For example, in Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 51 the Fourth Circuit
reversed a district court for improperly giving a matter to a jury that
should have been decided by the court, stating:
The district court used [the arbitrary and capricious) standard in its jury instructions .... It was error, however, for
the judge to submit this matter to a jury. Whether a
fiduciary has violated the arbitrary and capricious standard
is a matter for the court. The significance of the standard,
while second-nature to a judge, is not readily communicated
to jurors. 52
The Fourth Circuit concluded that, because the limited scope of
review was not compatible with the jury function, the plaintiff was
not entitled to have a jury apply this standard. 53 The court also
concluded that the limited scope of review was proof that Congress
did not intend to give a § 502 litigant a jury trial right. 54

b.

Breach of Contract Theory
In contrast, other federal district courts have taken the analysis
a step further and found an implied right to a jury trial. These courts
have characterized the ERISA suit as one for breach of contract
seeking damages,55 which is a traditional action at law triable to a
jury.~
,
An example of this approach is found in Bower v. Bunker Hill
Co. 57 In Bower, present and future pensioners brought a class action
against a corporation to obtain reinstatement of their medical insurance and damages for wrongful termination of the insurance. The
plaintiffs also brought a separate claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Jurisdiction was based on both § 502 and LMRA. In response, the
corporation filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs' jury demand,
arguing that the claims were "essentially equitable. "58 While the
50. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 830; accord Chilton, 814 F.2d at 623-24; Turner, 770
F.2d at 46; In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1982).
51. 761 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985).
52. Id. at 1006-07.
53. Id. at 1007.
54.Id.
55. See, e.g., Abbarno v. Carborundum Co., 682 F. Supp. 179, 181-82 (W.D.N.Y.
1988); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 597-98 (E.D. Wash. 1986);
Paladino v. Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 39-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
56. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
57. 114 F.R.D. 587, 598 (E.D. Wash. 1986).
58. Id. at 597.
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court granted the motion to strike on the breach of fiduciary duty
claim, it held that the plaintiffs' other claims could be tried before
a jury.59 Noting that the plaintiffs' claim for relief sought monetary
damages, including money spent to obtain other medical coverage
from the time that the plan had been terminated, the court concluded
that the claim was similar to a claim for breach of contract. 60
In granting the plaintiffs a jury trial on counts for wrongful
termination of the plan benefits, the Bower court, following the
reasoning propounded by the Supreme Court in Dairy Queen. Inc.
v. Wood,61 declared: .
.
§ 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA provides that a beneficiary may
bring an action for redress of violations of the terms of the
plan. A suit for breach of contract seeking damages was
traditionally an action at law and thus triable to a jury
under the Seventh Amendment. Thus, the plaintiffs have a
right to a jury determination of not only whether the
contract has been breached and the extent of damages if
any, but also just what the contract is. 62

Recognizing that its decision might appear facially inconsistent
with Wardle, the Bower court distinguished Wardle by noting that
"Wardle involved an [accounting) action brought by a beneficiary
against the plan trustee to enforce payment of 'pension benefits"
which is traditionally an equitable remedy. 63 Consequently, the court
found that there was "no basis for equating the present action with
those cases involving the discretionary refusal to pay benefits by a
trustee interpreting an existing plan."64
59.Id.
60. Id. at 597-98.
61. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). In Dairy Queen, plaintiff brought suit for the breach of
a written licensing contract. The complaint sought injunctive relief and an
award for damages in an amount to be determined from an accounting. In
reversing the motion to strike granted by the district court, the Supreme Court
noted that since the adoption of the Federal Rules, the right to a jury remained
for all legal Claims, even where both legal and equitable relief are sought in
the same case. The Court held that an action to collect a debt under a contract
was "traditionally legal." Id. at 477.
62. Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 598 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (citations
omitted).
63. Id. The reasoning of the Bower court is not entirely correct. In fact, the
plaintiff in Wardle sued for $92,400 in "compensatory damages" (plaintiff's
estimate as to the amount of benefits that would have accrued during his
lifetime), punitive damages, attorney's fees, costs, and "all other just and
proper relief." Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
64. Bower, 114 F.R.D. at 598. In a footnote, the court extended its holding even
further when it stated, "[e)ven if this case could be analogized to Wardle, it
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The decision in Bower has supplied several methods for plaintiffs
to plead a § 502 cause of action which would support a jury trial
demand: first, by fashioning a complaint for wrongful termination
of or interference with an· employee benefits plan as a claim for
breach of contract; second, by disputing or questioning the meaning
of one or more material provisions of the benefits plan; third, by
questioning the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the
employee benefits plan; and finally, by requesting relief for compensatory and punitive damages resulting from the alleged breach. 65 A
number of federal district courts, as well as one circuit court (albeit
in dicta), have similarly held that certain actions brought under §
502 were contractual and could be tried to a jury. 66

B.

The Seventh Amendment Right To a Jury Trial

If the right to a jury trial does not exist as an implied right
based upon the intent of the legislative body, the analysis turns on
whether the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution
provides such a right. The seventh amendment preserves the right to
a jury trial in suits "at common law. "67 The phrase "common law"

would not alter the conclusion that I reach today at least as to present
pensioners. Plaintiff present pensioners allege that they have met all of the
requirements of eligibility to medical benefits required under the plan. As far
as their claim for damages is concerned, it more closely resembles an action
to force payment of money immediately and unconditionally due. Such actions
have traditionally been construed as being legal." Id. at n.6 (citations omitted).
65. See Id. at 598; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
66. See Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. CO. V. DiGregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1251
n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (dicta) (issue relating to the interpretation of an insurance
policy was contractual in nature; thus, the beneficiary could have demanded a
jury trial had the case been tried); Puz V. Bessemer Cement Co., 700 F. Supp.
267, 268 (W.O. Pa. 1988) ("Although the present case does involve some
issues, such as the breach of fiduciary duty claims, which must be tried by the
court .. , the initial question and major issue in the case is contractual in
nature and involves factual ambiguities relating to the interpretation of the
termination provisions contained in the various agreements. Accordingly, the
court concludes that the plaintiffs are entitled to have these factual ambiguities
resolved by a jury. "); Paladino V. Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp.
37,39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[B]eneath this seemingly "equitable" issue [of having
the court review the exercise of fiduciary power by a plan trustee], there lurks
a simple question: whether plaintiff had a break in his service in the taxicab
industry which forfeited his prior service credit. This represents a pure question
of fact ... particularly appropriate for resolution by a trial jury.")
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment has not been made binding
on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 56 (1919) (dicta).
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in the seventh amendment is used to contrast cases in equity, admiralty, and maritime law. 68
The Supreme Court has asserted that the right to a trial by jury
guaranteed by the seventh amendment is a fundamental right of the
people69 which will be "guarded by the court with jealousy."7o This
view was reaffirmed by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provide that, "the right to a trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment . . . shall be preserved to the
parties inviolate. "71
The seventh amendment's reference to "suits at common law"
is not limited to actions traditionally tried in the law courts of
England in 1791, but includes suits in which legal rights are to be
"ascertained and determined."72 The Supreme Court has further held
that this analysis not only applies to common law forms of action,
but also to causes of action created by congressional enactments,
even where the action created was unheard of at common law. 73
The Supreme Court in Tull v. United States74 set forth factors
for courts to consider in determining the "legal nature" of an issue.
These factors include the custom of dealing with such questions
before the merger of the courts of law and equity and the remedy
sought. 7S The Court emphasized that the second factor is more
important than the first. 76 A third factor to consider when determining
whether the seventh amendment confers a jury trial right is the
practical abilities and limitations of juries. 77
68. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830). In Parsons, the Court noted that
the distinction between these types of actions was present in the framers' minds
when they drafted the amendment. Thus, the Court concluded that the scope
of the "common law" was not limited to those types of suits which the
common law recognized among its "old and settled proceedings," but also
included suits in which legal rights were determined and legal remedies administered. Id. at 447.
69. Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752 (1942).
70. Baylis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316 (1885).
71. FED. R. CIY. P. 38(a).
72. Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447.
73. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
74. 481 U.S. 412 (f987). See generally Note, Tull v. United States: Jury Trial
Required in Statutory Civil Penalty Actions, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 435.
75. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18.
76. Id. at 421.
77. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.l0 (1970). As noted in Tull, however,
the Court has never relied on this consideration "as an independent basis for
extending the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment." Tull, 481
U.S. at 418 n.4 (1987). Additionally, the Court may have severely restricted
the viability of this step when it noted in Granjinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989), that the consideration of whether the action is
appropriate for a jury is only relevant in determining whether Congress
permissibly delegated certain adjudications to administrative agencies, and
whether the jury trial would impair the functioning of the legislative scheme.
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Prior to 1989, few courts found claims brought under § 502
conferred a seventh amendment jury trial right. 78 The courts that
ultimately denied the right to a jury trial based on the seventh
amendment provided little discussion of the governing principles
announced by the Supreme Court. For example, in Blau v. Del
Monte Corp., 79 the Ninth Circuit relegated its entire analysis of the
plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial to a single sentence when
it summarily stated "[n]or is there an independent constitutional or
statutory right to jury trial in ERISA actions."so
Similarly, in In re Vorpahl,81 the Eighth Circuit, after rejecting
the claim that the right to a jury trial was implied by § 502, dismissed
petitioner's constitutional claim that the seventh amendment granted
him a jury trial. In so doing, the court held:
The right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment
depends on the nature of the issue to be tried. Traditionally,
claims for present and future pension benefits . . . have
been viewed as equitable in nature and triable by a court.
As we observed earlier [in the discussion of whether ERISA
impliedly gave the right to jury trial], Congress intended to
preserve this view when it enacted section 502 of ERISA.
The mere fact that plaintiffs pray for monetary relief in
part does not mandate that this action be characterized as
legal rather than equitable. 82
78. See, e.g., In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1982) (no constitutional
right to a jury trial in § 502 actions); Wardle v. Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 830 n.21 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981) ("In light of our conclusion above that this claim
is equitable, no further discussion is necessary to reject [plaintiff's] constitutional argument."); Whitt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 676 F. Supp. 1119,
1133 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (supplementary memorandum opinion) ("The Eleventh
Circuit either has not yet been called upon to address, or has not addressed,
the Seventh Amendment when comparing ERISA claims which are kin to
traditional common law claims and ERISA claims which are like those formerly
dealt with by the chancellor."), rev'd, Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ala.,
868 F.2d 430 (lith Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989); Paladino v.
Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (summarily
agreeing with defendants that "there is no Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial in ERISA actions"). But see, Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587,
597-98 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (plaintiff's § 502 claim is akin to a claim for breach
of contract, which is traditionally legal; thus, the constitution guarantees
plaintiff's right to a jury trial).
79. 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).
80. [d. at 1357.
81. 695 F.2d at 322.
82. [d. at 322 (citations omitted); See a/so Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636
(3d Cir. 1989) (benefits under § 502 are equitable in nature; therefore, plaintiff
is not entitled to a jury trial).
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Some of the federal courts analyzing the § 502 jury trial issue
have given at least minimal consideration to the seventh amendment
issue before denying a jury trial request. Other courts, however, have
been silent on the constitutional question, relying entirely on implied
statutory grounds in concluding that no jury right exists. 83
Those courts which expressly addressed the seventh amendment
in the ERISA context prior to the 1989 Supreme Court decisions in
Firestone Tire & Rubber Ce'. v. Bruch 84 and Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg,8S as well as the later Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers,
Local 391 v. TerryM decision, have generally maintained that there
is no constitutional guarantee of a right to a jury trial in cases under
§ 502.87 Moreover, while few courts found an implied statutory right
to a jury trial in a § 502 action, not all of those courts similarly
found that a constitutional guarantee of a right to a jury trial existed
in the absence of the legislative intent embodied in the statute. For
example, in Paladino v. Taxicab Industry Pension Fund,88 the court
began its discussion on whether plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial
by "agreeing with the defendants that there is no seventh amendment
right to jury trial in [all] ERISA actions," and viewing those actions
as "essentially equitable in nature. "89
In § 502 cases where a jury trial right has been found, some of
the opinions are vague as to whether the right was preserved based
on legislative intent grounds or on seventh amendment grounds. For
example, although the district court in Abbarno v. Carborundum
CO.,90 did not address the seventh amendment, it nonetheless appeared
to be applying the constitutional standard when it held:
In the present case, . . . plaintiffs bring an ERISA claim
that does not seek equitable relief. Rather they seek an
83. See, e.g., Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1989) (no discussion of

84.
85.
86.
87.

88.
89.
90.

the seventh amendment in denying plaintiff's prayer for a jury); Chilton v.
Savannah Foods & Indus., Inc. 814 F.2d 620 (11th Cir. 1987) (no discussion
of the constitutional right to a jury trial); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d
1003 (4th Cir. 1985) (no discussion of the constitutional right to a jury trial);
Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding only that ERISA
does not entitle plaintiff's to a jury trial). But see Cox v. Keystone Carbon
Co., 861 F.2d 390, 394 (3d Cir. 1988) (remanding plaintiff's claim to examine
the substance of the pleadings and determine whether plaintiff had pleaded a
cause of action under § 502, and, if so, to decide if the seventh amendment
entitled him to a jury trial).
489 U.S. 101 (1989).
492 U.S. 33 (1989).
494 U.S. 558 (1990).
See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
588 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id. The court went on to find that Congress nevertheless intended to grant a
litigant the right to a trial by jury. Id.
682 F. Supp. 179 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
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award for damages for nonpayment of benefits. . . . The
plaintiffs' claim being essentially legal in nature, it is wholly
appropriate for them to request a trial by jury. 91
One case that specifically did employ the seventh amendment as
a basis for granting an ERISA jury trial right is Bower v. Bunker
Hill CO.92 In Bower, the court cited the three part test developed by
the Supreme Court,93 and agreed with plaintiff's seventh amendment
argument that because the ERISA claim asserted was similar to a
breach of contract action for damages, the plaintiffs had a constitutional right to a trial by jury.94
C.

Summary of the Law Prior to 1989

Prior to 1989, a majority of the federal courts considering the
§ 502 jury trial issue had concluded that there is neither a statutory
nor constitutional basis for granting a § 502 litigant a jury trial.
Additionally, a minority of courts that did grant a jury trial were
more comfortable relying upon legislative intent grounds rather than
the seventh amendment. In light of several recent Supreme Court
decisions, however, litigants seeking a jury trial in an ERISA action
may have an easier time supporting their jury request on constitutional grounds.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT POSITION ON
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN ERISA ACTIONS AND THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT
In three recent decisions, the Supreme Court both changed the
standard of review used in § 502 actions and reaffirmed the scope
of the seventh amendment's preservation of the jury trial right in
cases brought under federal statutes that are silent on the jury trial
issue.

A. The ERISA Standard of Review: Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co. v. Bruch
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,9s plaintiffs, employees
of a division of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company ("Firestone"),
sued Firestone under § 502 to recover severance benefits allegedly
due when Firestone sold the division to another company. Firestone
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

[d. at 181-82.
114 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Wash. 1986).
[d. at 597-98 (citing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962».
[d. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
489 U.S. 101 (1989).
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had denied plaintiffs' request on the grounds that there had not been
a reduction in work force that would authorize benefits under the
terms of the plan. 96
The district court granted Firestone's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the company had not breached its fiduciary
duty and that its decision was not arbitrary or capricious. 97 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that where
an employer itself is a fiduciary and administrator of an unfunded
benefit plan, the employer's decision to deny benefits should be
subject to a de novo standard of review, and not an arbitrary and
capricious standard. 98
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Third
Circuit's holding as to the appropriate standard of review. 99 The
Court held that although it was Jhe "general intent" of Congress to
incorporate in ERISA much of the fiduciary law of LMRA, the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review developed under LMRA
should not be adopted "wholesale" and applied to claims brought
under § 502.100 In distinguishing ERISA from LMRA, the Court
stated:
Unlike the LMRA, ERISA explicitly authorizes suits against
fiduciaries and plan administrators to remedy statutory violations, including breaches of fiduciary duty and lack of
compliance with benefit plans. Thus, the [reason behind]. . .the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard-the
need for a jurisdictional basis in suits against trustees-is not
present in ERISA. Without this jurisdictional analogy, LMRA
principles offer no support for the adoption of the arbitrary
and capricious standard insofar as [§ 502] is concerned. 101
The Court held that a de novo standard of review would apply to
plaintiff's § 502 claims, "regardless of whether the plan at issue is
funded or unfunded and regardless of whether the administrator or
fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual conflict of interest. "102
Despite preference for a de novo standard of review, the Court
indicated one instance when an arbitrary and capricious standard
would still apply in § 502 actions. According to the Court, the
arbitrary and capricious standard would apply if the benefit plan
96. Id. at 105.
97. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1986),
a/I'd in part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987).
98. 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987).
99. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108.
100. Id. at 109.
101. Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at liS.
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expressly gives the plan administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to either construe the terms of the plan or determine eligibility
for plan benefits. 103
The Court rejected Firestone's argument that plan interpretation
is an "inherently discretionary function," precluding the requirement
that the plan's terms grant the trustee authority to interpret the plan's
provisions. Instead, the Court analogized the judiciary's role in
construing terms of trust agreements to their role in construing terms
of contracts. I04 In the Court's view, actions which challenged an
employer's denial of benefits before ERISA was enacted were governed by the law of contracts. lOS Thus, the terms of trusts that are
created by written instruments must be "determined by the provisions
of the instrument as interpreted in light of all the circumstances. "106
as construed by the court, and "without deferring to either party's
interpretation." 107

B. The Supreme Court's Recent Position on the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Triai: Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 v.
Terry
1.

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg

In Granjinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,l08 the plaintiff, a bankruptcy trustee for the Chase & Sanborn Corporation (' 'Chase and
Sanborn"),I09 filed suit in the district court against Granfinanciera,

103. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989). This
exception may have swallowed the rule since, as a matter of course in light of
Firestone, nearly all new ERISA governed benefit plans now include language
which provides for administrator discretion. J:lint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary
and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 133, 136 (1989). See
generally Beaver, The Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits Denial Cases
After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Revolution or Deja Vu, TORT &
INSURANCE L.J. 1 (Fall 1990) ("At least one lesson from Bruch is obvious:
Plan sponsors and drafters should craft new plans, and review and amend
existing ones, to incorporate this elective deferential review of benefit claims
decisions.' ').
104. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112.
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4, Comment d (1959».
107. [d.
108. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
109. [d. at 36. Chase and Sanborn was undergoing a reorganization proceeding
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 &
Supp. V).
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S.A. and Medex, Ltda. IIO In this suit, the trustee alleged that the
defendants had fraudulently received funds from Chase & Sanborn's
corporate predecessor within one year of the date that its bankruptcy
petition was filed without receiving consideration. III The trustee sought
to avoid these allegedly fraudulent conveyances and to recover damages for constructive and actual fraud, as well as interest, costs and
expenses, as allowed under the Bankruptcy Code. 1I2
The district court referred the proceedings to the bankruptcy
court, and both defendants requested a jury trial "on all issues so
triable. "113 The bankruptcy court denied defendant's request, reasoning that a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer was "a core action
that originally, under the English common law ... was a non-jury
issue."114 After a bench trial in which monetary damages were
assessed against both defendants on the fraud claim, the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court without discussing defendants' claim
that they had a right to a jury trial. lls
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 1I6 In
affirming, the court held that defendants lacked a right to a jury
trial under the statute because the provision of law under which suit
was brought contained no express grant of a jury trial right. 117
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held that the seventh amendment
did not preserve the jury trial right because actions to recover
fraudulent transfers were "equitable in nature, even when a plaintiff
seeks only monetary relief," and further, because "bankruptcy proceedings are inherently equitable."118
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit on seventh
amendment grounds. In doing so, the Court applied long established
rules for analyzing the constitutional right to a jury trial and noted
that, of these standards, the examination of the remedy sought is
more important than trying to find an 18th-century English common
law analogy.1I9
Nonetheless, in comparing the statutory action at issue to 18thcentury actions brought in the courts of England, Justice Brennan,
110. Id. at 36-37. Granfinanciera w~s a bank located in Bogota, Colombia. After

111.
112.
113.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

119.

being served with the plaintiff's complaint, the government of Colombia
nationalized Granfinanciera. The opinion does not discuss whether Medex
Ltda. is also a Colombian corporation.
Granjinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 835 F.2d 1341 (lith Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1349.
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,42 (l989).
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writing for the majority, found that the historical practice in England
to recover funds from a fraudulent conveyance were often brought
in the courts of law, and that had the plaintiff in Granfinanciera
brought suit in 1791 in England, a court of law, not equity, would
have adjudicated it. l20 The Court also concluded that the nature of
the relief requested, that is, monetary damages, "strongly supports
our preliminary finding that the right [plaintiff] invokes should be
denominated legal rather than equitable." 121 The Court found that
the relief of monetary damages of a fixed amount in this case could
not go forward in equity because an adequate remedy was available
at law. According to the Court, the rule favoring actions at law
"serves to guard the right of trial by jury preserved by the seventh
amendment and to that end it should be liberally construed."122
Even more astonishing than the Court's liberal construction of.
the seventh amendment was the fact that the parties in Granfinanciera
were litigating their case in bankruptcy court, assigned to non-Article
III judges sitting without juries. The Court, however, disregarded
this fact and asserted that Congress' assignment of such actions to
an administrative agency could not be used to justify denying a
jury.123 Specifically, the Court rejected the notion that jury trials
could not be had because "bankruptcy proceedings have been placed
in an 'administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible. '" 124

2.

Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry
A recent Supreme Court opinion concerning the seventh amendment's preservation of the jury trial right in an action arising under
a federal statute is Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 v.
Terry.125 In Terry, employees sued both their employer and union
for injunctive relief and monetary damages, alleging that the employer.
had breached their collective bargaining agreement in violation of
120.
121.
122.
123.

[d. at 42-43.
[d. at 47.
[d. at 48 (quoting Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932».
[d. at 51-52. The majority did note in dicta that Congress could permissibly
deny a jury trial in an administrative adjudication "in cases where 'public
rights' are litigated." [d. at 51. The term "public right" was defined by the
Court as involving "the Government and persons subject to its authority in
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive
or legislative departments." Id. at 51 n.8 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932».
124. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61-62 (1989). In dissent, Justice
White severely criticized the majority's approach as failing to consider the
forum that the dispute is to be heard in as an element of the seventh amendment
analysis. [d. at 79-84 (White, J., dissenting).
125. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
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the LMRA and that the union had violated its duty of fair representation. 126 Subsequently, the employees' suit against the employer was
voluntarily dismissed after the employer filed for bankruptcy. The
union, however, still facing a claim for breach of its duty to represent,
moved to strike the plaintiffs' jury demand. 127 The district court
denied the motion to strike, asserting that, because plaintiffs had
asserted legal rights and remedies, the seventh amendment preserved
their right to a jury trial. I28 On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had correctly upheld
the plaintiffs' jury trial right on the issues of declaratory judgment
relief and damages. 129
.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in an opinion written
by Justice Marshall, affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit. 130
In so doing, the Court recognized that because the plaintiffs' claim
against the union was only inferred from and not expressed in the
LMRA, the analysis of the statute for any expressed or implied jury
trial provisions contained therein was "unavailing." 131 Given this,
th~ Court focused its analysis on the seventh amendment.132
In comparing the claim before it to 18th-century actions brought
in England, the Court discussed the Union's argument that a claim
for breach of duty of fair representation was comparable to an action
brought by trust beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty, which
were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the equity courts. 133 Although persuaded that the Union's analogy to the law of trusts
extended to suits brought against a union by its members, six
members of the Court nevertheless agreed that, "the trust analogy
does not persuade us to characterize [the Union's] claim as wholly
equitable."134 Instead, the Court stated that "[t]he Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather
than the character of the overall action."13s The Court reasoned that,
because the plaintiffs were required to first prove the legal issue of

126. [d. at 562 n.1. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 provides for

suits by and against labor unions for violation of the union contract with the
employer. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
127. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391, 676 F. Supp. 659, 661
(M.D.N.C. 1987).
128. [d.

129. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391, 863 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.
1988).
130. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
131. [d. at 564 n.3.
132. [d. at 564-65.
133. [d. at 568-69.
134. [d. at 569.
135. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391, 494 U.S. 558, 569 (1990)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970».
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whether the employer had violated the LMRA before proving the
"equitable issue" of whether the union breached its duty of fair
representation, the plaintiffs' action against the union encompassed
both legal and equitable issues. 136 The Court concluded that "[t]he
first part of our Seventh Amendment inquiry, then, leaves us in
equipoise as to whether [plaintiffs] are entitled to a jury trial."l37
In the second step of the analysis, the Court considered the
remedy sought by the employees, noting that the remedy consisted
of an award of money for lost wages and benefits and that the
"general rule" was that such relief was "the traditional form of
relief offered in the courts of law."13s Consequently, the Court held:
[B]ecause we conclude that the remedy [plaintiffs] seek has
none of the attributes that must be present before we will
find an exception to the general rule and characterize damages as equitable, we find that the remedy sought by [plaintiffs] is legal.139
The "attributes" of monetary relief which the Court referred to as
possibly being "equitable" included: (1) restitutionary damages such
as in "action[s] for disgorgement of improper profits,"I40 and (2) a
monetary award that is "incidental to or entwined with injunctive
relief. "141
In dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Scalia, believed that an award of back pay is an equitable remedy
because it is closely analogous to damages awarded to beneficiaries
for a trustee's breach of trust.l 42 The majority criticized this view
because it would render dispositive that part of the seventh amendment analysis analogizing claims to 18th-century English claims.143 In
the majority's view, such a result would be contrary to earlier law
which defines the nature of the relief requested as "more important
to the Seventh Amendment determination. "144 In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan posited that he would do away altogether with
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

141.
142.
143.
144.

[d. at 569.
[d. at 570.
[d. at 570 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 181, 196 (1974».
[d. at 570.
[d. The Court concluded that the back pay sought by the plaintiffs was not
money wrongfully held by the defendant, but wages and benefits that they
would have received from their employer had the defendant not breached its
duty of fair representation. Thus, the relief sought was not, in the Court's
view, restitution. [d. at 571-72.
[d. at 571. The Court held that because the plaintiffs had only sought money
damages, "this characteristic is clearly absent from this case." [d. at 571.
[d. at 586-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
[d. at 571 n.8.
[d.
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the 18th-century analogy test, and would instead "decide Seventh
Amendment questions on the basis of the relief sought. "145
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE § 502 JURY TRIAL
ISSUE

A.

The Impact oj Firestone

The change in the standard of review mandated by the Supreme
Court in Firestone has been followed by one federal district court as
support for granting a jury trial in a § 502 action. In Vicinanzo v.
Brunshwig & Fils, Inc., 146 the plaintiff was insured under a group
insurance policy when she became permanently disabled. Several years
after coverage under the major medical portion of this policy began,
the policy was terminated. 147 The plaintiff filed suit under § 502
challenging the cancellation and defendants (both her employer and
insurance company) moved to strike the demand for a jury trial. The
defendants argued that the plaintiff's claim was equitable in nature
and that the statutory scheme did not imply a jury right. 148
In rejecting the motion to strike, the district court relied in part
upon the Firestone decision. The court did not cite Firestone, however, as supporting the implied statutory right to a jury trial. I49 On
the contrary, the court stated:
Quite apart from the implied statutory right to a jury trial
. . . recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of
ERISA . . . implies that contests over the meaning of ambiguous plan provisions - the resolution of which often
results in the recovery of money damages or a declaration
as to whether money will be recovered in the future - more
closely resemble legal than equitable claims. ISO
145. Id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice
Brennan added that given that over the past 15 years, the Court has explained
that the two parts of the seventh amendment test are unequally weighted,
"there remains little purpose to our rattling through dusty attics of ancient
writs." Id. at 575.
146. 739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
147. Id. at 883.
148. /d.
149. Following its own pre-Firestone decision in Paladino v. Taxicab Indus. Pension
Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court declared that "it was the
intent of Congress that ERISA plan enforcement actions be regarded as legal
in nature, and that litigants be entitled to a jury trial." Vicinanzo, 739 F.
Supp. at 885.
150. Vicinanzo, 739 F. Supp. at 890.
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In reaching its decision, the Vicin~nzo court read Firestone as holding
that contests over the interpretation of vague plan provisions more
closely resemble actions at law,lsi and under such circumstances the
right to a jury is preserved by the seventh amendment. 152
In contrast to the position taken by the Vicinanzo court, other
courts that have addressed the § 502 issue, including one circuit
court, have rejected the proposition that the Firestone change in the
standard of review supports the right to a jury trial. I53 For example,
in Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance CO.,154 beneficiaries
to a group health insurance plan brought suit to recover compensation
allegedly owed by the insurer. The plaintiffs were denied a jury trial
and appealed. On appeal the beneficiaries argued, based upon Firestone, that the change in the standard of review from arbitrary and
capricious to de novo "converts the claim from an equitable claim
to a breach of contract action, which entitles them to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment." ISS
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the plaintiffs' § 502
action was still equitable notwithstanding the requested monetary
relief. ls6 The court characterized the plaintiffs' request for money
damages as "the benefits they are allegedly entitled to under the
plan."ls7 While admitting that, since medical treatment had already
been completed, an award of money "would satisfy [p]laintifrs
demands," the court nevertheless opined that "if the claimant were
still under treatment, only an order for continuing benefits would be
sufficient. "158 The court concluded that such a judicial order would
amount to "traditionally equitable relief." IS9 ,
Similarly, in Quesinberry v. Individual Banking Group Accident
Insurance Plan l60 the court rejected the Firestone argument. In Quesinberry, plaintiff argued that Firestone called into doubt earlier cases
holding against a § 502 jury trial right. 161 The plaintiff further argued
that Firestone had invalidated the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit's
151. [d.
152. See id. at 890-91.
153. See, e.g., Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life IilS. Co., 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir.
1990); Quesinberry v. Individual Banking Group Ins. Plan, 737 F. Supp. 38
(W.O. Va. 1990); Pardini v. Southern Nevada Culinary & Bartenders Pension
Plan & Trust, 733 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Nev. 1990).
154. 906 F.2d 1525 (lith Cir. 1990).
155. [d. at 1526.
156. [d.
157. [d.
158. [d.
159. [d. Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir.
1990).
160. 737 F. Supp. 38 (W.O. Va. 1990).
161. [d. at 41.
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decision in Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,162 which had held that a jury
trial should be denied because jurors were not capable of applying
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 163 The Quesinberry court,
however, rejected this reasoning. The court correctly noted that the
Fourth Circuit in Berry had given more than one reason for its
decision to deny a jury right:
the Court in Berry also cited the common law of trusts as
support for its decision, stating that "[c]ourts addressing
this issue have almost uniformly held that under the common
law of trusts proceedings to determine rights under employee
benefit plans are equitable in nature, and thus a matter for
a judge, not a jury."I64
The lower court's treatment of the Firestone change in the
standard of review has not resulted in any sweeping changes to a §
502 litigant's right to a jury trial. The few district courts that have
discussed the ERISA jury trial in light of Firestone continue to deny
a jury right on implied statutory grounds. These courts have reasoned
that earlier decisions which found no implied statutory right to a §
502 jury trial were grounded' on more than just the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. Firestone's impact on the seventh
amendment right to a § 502 jury trial has been equally unavaIling.
To date, only one district court has cited Firestone's change in the
standard of review as lending constitutional support to a jury right.
Consequently, at this juncture Firestone has had minimal impact on
the litigant's jury trial right under § 502.

B.

The Impact of Granfinanciera and Terry
While Firestone has not caused widespread revision in the federal
courts' position that ERISA does not impliedly grant a jury trial, a
number of courts have relied on the Granfinanciera and Terry
decisions in extending a jury trial right under the seventh,amendment
to § 502 claims. Various district courts, including several district
courts within the Eleventh Circuit, have embraced either Granfinanciera or Terry, or both, in holding that a constitutional right to a
jury trial exists in § 502 actions .165 The Eleventh Circuit is the only
162. 761 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985).
163. 737 F. Supp. at 41.
164. [d.; accord Pardini v. Southern Nevada Culinary & Bartenders Pension Plan
& Trust, 733 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Nev. 1990) (recognizing that the earlier circuit
court decisions against giving a jury trial right relied in part on the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review).
165. See, e.g., Weber v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 751 F. Supp. 21 (D. Conn. 1990);
Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ala.
1990); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla.
1990); Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp 582 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
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federal appellate court which has addressed the seventh amendment
§ 502 jury trial issue in light of Granjinanciera and Terry. 166

One court which has interpreted Granjinanciera and Terry in
the § 502 context is the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Florida. In· Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Insurance CO.,167
plaintiffs filed a claim with defendant insurer to recover $850,000
for medical treatment arising from a brain stem hemorrhage. Defendant denied the claim, asserting that the hemorrhage was the result
of a pre-existing medical condition. l68 Plaintiffs then sued under §
502 .to recover medical insurance benefits allegedly owed under a
policy issued by defendant and sought a jury trial. I69
In granting the plaintiffs' request for a jury trial, the district
court noted that "[t]he fact finder will therefore be determining
nothing more than whether defendant's pre-existing defense is or is
not applicable ... "170 as well as determining the extent of damages. 171
In short, the court characterized the plaintiffs' claim as "nothing
more than a breach of contract claim for the recovery of money
damages." 172
In holding that a constitutional right to a jury trial existed, the
court relied on both Granjinanciera and Terry. The court viewed the
reasoning in Granjinanciera as "directly applicable to the present
case. "173 The court also noted, based on Terry, that the statutory
right created by § 502 is essentially a legal claim for a breach of
contract. 174 The court concluded that based on this recent seventh
amendment precedent, the plaintiffs in Gangitano could similarly
have a jury. I7S
In two recent opinions from the federal distrkt court in Alabama, Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Alabama Distributing CO.176 and
Jordan v. Reliable Life Insurance CO.,177 the district court of Alabama
denied motions to strike jury trial requests and concluded that
Granjinanciera was controlling.
In the earlier Jordan decision, the court presaged in dicta what
would later be its holding in Rhodes when it observed that "[t]he
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See infra notes 183-185 and accompanying text.
733 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
[d. at 342.
[d.
[d. at 343.
[d.
Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342, 343 (S.D. Fla.
1990).
[d.
[d.
[d. at 343-44.
741 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (mem.).
716 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (mem.).
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Supreme Court, as presentiy constituted most definitely believes in
the Seventh Amendment, a belief this court enthusiastically shares."178
The court interpreted the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence as
being written "in terms unmistakably applicable to ERISA cases."179
In Rhodes, the court went further, holding that, in its view, the
leading Eleventh Circuit case on ERISA jury trial jurisprudence,
Chilton v. Savannah Foods and Industries,180 no longer represented
the law of that circuit in the aftermath of Granfinanciera and Terry.
The court concluded that a seventh amendment right to a jury trial
exists in § 502 actions in light of "the Supreme Court's post-Chilton
decisions bearing on the availability of a jury trial in an action
invoking a congressional enactment." 181 The court also borrowed an
earlier observation made by Chief Judge Brieant of the Southern
District of New York, when it hypothesized that "[p]erhaps because
the right to a jury trial on claims of legal entitlement is so obvious,
ERISA makes no express provision for jury trials .... "182
Finally, in Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc.,183 the district
court thoroughly discussed the seventh amendment right to a jury
trial in § 502 actions in light of the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. In concluding that plaintiffs had a seventh amendment right
to a jury, the court characterized the Supreme Court cases as a
"recognition of the true force of the Seventh Amendment" which
"suggests doctrinal change affecting a host of federal statutes that
do not involve the adjudication of 'public rights' by non-Article III
tribunals. "184

[d. at 585 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989».
[d. at 583 n.1.
814 F.2d 620 (11th Cir. 1987). But see infra, note 186.
741 F. Supp. at 1543. Although the court never explicitly referred to the Terry
or Gran/inanciera decisions, the court did cite to a number of previous district
court decisions which had cited to the Supreme Court cases by name. [d.
182. [d. at 1544 (citations omitted). The opinion also contains a lengthy, often
vibrant, discussion of the history of the seventh amendment, and the jury
practice in pre-1791 England.
183. 739 F. Supp. 882, 887-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
184. [d. at 889. As further proof of the scope of these changes, the court referred
to a gratuitous footnote published in Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S.
545 (1990), decided on the same day as Terry. In Lytle, the Supreme Court
observed that it had "not ruled on the question whether a plaintiff seeking
relief under Title VII has a right to a jury trial[.]" [d. at 549 n.1. The
Vicinanzo court found this footnote to be "astonishing" since Title VII has
"long been regarded as a non-jury statute." 739 F. Supp at 889. The Southern
District of New York concluded that "[t]aken together, the Supreme Court's
recent cases suggest that statutory causes of action giving rise to individual
claims for money damages are rarely, if ever, beyond the reach of the Seventh
Amendment." [d. at 890.

178.
179.
180.
181.

1991]

ERISA Benefit Recovery Actions

505

Of the courts facing the seventh amendment right to a jury trial
in a § 502 action after Granfinanciera and Terry, only one court the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - has expressly cited
to Terry and Granfinanciera while still denying the jury right. In
Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance Co., 18S the court denied
plaintiffs request for a jury trial in a § 502 action to recover a fixed
sum of money allegedly due under a group insurance plan. It is
noteworthy, however, that despite citing to both Supreme Court jury
trial cases, the Blake court never explicitly discusses the effects of
either Terry or Granfinanciera on the jury trial right. In fact, while
the court does address those two cases, it does so only in supporting
a separate proposition; namely, that the change in the standard of
review caused by Firestone from arbitrary and capricious to de novo
does not "control the application of the Seventh Amendment" in a
§ 502 action. 186 Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the Eleventh
Circuit would read Terry and Granfinanciera to support the seventh
amendment jury trial right in a § 502 action. 187
VI.

CONCLUSION

The issue of whether a litigant has a right to a jury trial in a §
502 action is still open among the federal courts at both the district
and circuit level. While a majority of courts tend to agree that there
is no implied statutory authority that preserves the right, a handful
of courts continue to read the legislative history to imply a right to
a jury trial. Although the change in the standard of review in
Firestone has had minimal impact on the § 502 jury trial issue, the
recent Supreme Court decisions in Granfinanciera and Terry have
sparked some new debate in federal courts deciding whether the
seventh amendment preserves a jury trial right in a § 502 action.
Several district courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's seventh
amendment jurisprudence to grant a constitutional right to a § 502
jury trial.
Given the force of the holdings in Granfinanciera and Terry and
the present composition of the Court, if the Supreme Court were to
185. 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990).
186. [d. at 1526.

187. Thus, the Northern District of Alabama was in error when it asserted in Rhodes
v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ala. 1990), that
the leading Eleventh Circuit case on the § 502 jury trial issue, Chilton v.
Savannah Foods & Indus., 814 F.2d 620 (lith Cir. 1987), was no longer good
law in light of the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the seventh amendment issue. Rhodes, 741 F. Supp at 1543. Rhodes was decided just one day
before Blake. Since the Blake court cited its earlier decision in Chilton with
approval, see Blake 906 F.2d at 1526, then Chilton is apparently still the law
of the Eleventh Circuit on the § 502 jury issue.
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decide· whether a litigant in a § 502 action is entitled to a jury trial,
it appears quite likely that if the litigant were to seek monetary relief,
the Court would hold that the seventh amendment preserves the right
to have a jury hear the case. This conclusion is drawn from several
observations: (1) the Court's increasing emphasis on the "type of
relief requested" element of the seventh amendment test, and its
corresponding waning emphasis on the importance of the historical
analogy; (2) the Court's treatment of the trust analogy in Terry, in
·which it held that even though the plaintiff's claim was analogous
to a suit at trust, which is historically equitable, the Court nevertheless
found a jury trial right; (3) the Court's decision in Firestone changing
the standard of review to de novo, thus avoiding any potential
problem a jury would have in applying the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review; and (4) the Court's decision in Granfinanciera
granting a jury trial right in an administrative bankruptcy proceeding,
where jury trials had never been held previously and which are seated
by non-Article III judges. Taken together, these three Supreme Court
decisions indicate that the present court is quite willing to utilize the
seventh amendment to preserve the right to a trial by jury in cases
where the plaintiff seeks legal relief, regardless of the historical
practice.
A civil litigant in federal court seeking an ERISA jury trial
should argue, based on this recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, that
the seventh amendment preserves the right to a jury trial. The § 502
claim should be styled as an action for breach of contract (the
contract being the benefit's plan that is covered by ERISA), requesting monetary relief. Moreover, if the complaint alleges disputes as
to the interpretation of provisions in the "contract," the litigant will
be even more likely to have a jury resolve his claims, as long as the
ERISA plan does not expressly grant the plan administrator the
discretion to interpret its provisions.

Michael McCabe, Jr.

